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We introduce a non-cooperative model of bargaining when players
are divided into coalitions. The model is a modiﬁcation of the mech-
anism in Vidal-Puga (Economic Theory, 2005) so that all the players
have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players
maintain their own "right to talk" when joining a coalition. We apply
this model to an intriguing example presented by Krasa, Tamimi and
Yannelis (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003) and show that
the Harsanyi paradox (forming a coalition may be disadvantageous)
disappears.
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11 Introduction
Many economic situations can be modelled as a set of agents or players with
independent interests who may beneﬁt from cooperation. Moreover, it is not
infrequent that these agents have partitioned themselves into coalitions (such
as unions, cartels, or syndicates) for the purpose of bargaining.
Assuming that cooperation is carried out, the question is how to share the
beneﬁt between the coalitions and between the members inside each coalition,
i.e. which “value” best represents the expectation of each individual. The
economic theory has addressed this problem from two diﬀerent points of
view. One of them is axiomatic, or cooperative. The other one is positive,
or non-cooperative.
The axiomatic point of view focuses on ﬁnding allocations which satisfy
“fair” (or at least “reasonable”) properties, such as eﬃciency (the ﬁnal out-
come must be eﬃcient), symmetry (players with the same characteristics
must receive the same), etc. The non-cooperative point of view leads to the
study of the allocations which arise in a given non-cooperative environment.
In this paper, we follow a non-cooperative approach.
Taking an axiomatic point of view, Owen (1977) presented a value for
transfer utility games with coalition structure. Further axiomatic charac-
terizations were provided by Hart and Kurz (1983), Winter (1992), Calvo,
Lasaga and Winter (1996) and Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004), among others.
Owen assumed that this structure was exogenously given. Hart and Kurz
(1983) reinterpreted the Owen value assuming that players form coalitions
in order to improve their bargaining power.
Under both approaches, the main idea is that the coalitions play among
themselves as individual agents in a game between coalitions, and the surplus
obtained by each coalition is distributed among its members.
Recently, the Owen value has been non-cooperatively supported by Vidal-
Puga and Bergantiños (2003) and Vidal-Puga (2005). In these papers, the
players play a non-cooperative mechanism1 in two stages: in the ﬁrst stage,
1To avoid ambiguities with cooperative games, we use the term non-cooperative mech-
2the players inside a coalition bargain among themselves the strategy to follow
in the second stage, where bargaining takes place among coalitions.
Vidal-Puga (2005) generalizes a previous mechanism of Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996). In Hart and Mas-Colell’s model, a player is randomly chosen
i no r d e rt op r o p o s eap a y o ﬀ. If this proposal is not accepted by all the
other players, the mechanism is played again under the same conditions with
probability ρ ∈ [0,1). With probability 1 − ρ, the proposer leaves the game
and the mechanism is repeated with the rest of the players.
In Vidal-Puga (2005), this procedure is played in two rounds. First, agree-
ments are negotiated within coalitions and then through delegates among
coalitions. In the ﬁrst round, a player is randomly chosen out of each coali-
tion and proposes a payoﬀ. Each proposal is voted by the rest of the members
of its own coalition. If one of them rejects the proposal, the mechanism is
either played again under the same conditions (probability ρ), or the pro-
poser leaves the game and the mechanism is repeated with the rest of the
players (probability 1 − ρ). If there is no rejection, the proposal of one of
the coalitions is randomly chosen. If this proposal is not accepted by all
other coalitions, the mechanism is played again under the same conditions
(probability ρ), or the entire proposing coalition leaves the game and the
mechanism is repeated with the rest of the players (probability 1 − ρ).
Vidal-Puga (2005) shows that this mechanism in two rounds implements
the Owen value in a non-restrictive class of games.
Frequently, it is interpreted that players form coalition structures in order
to improve their bargaining strength (Hart and Kurz (1983)). However, as
Harsanyi (1977, p. 203) points out, the bargaining strength does not improve
in general. An individual can be worse oﬀ bargaining as a member of a
coalition than bargaining alone. Chae and Heidhues (2004, p. 47) provide
an explanation for this paradox. By merging in a coalition structure, players
reduce their multiple "rights to talk" to a single right in the game between
coalitions, hence improving the position of the outsiders.
anism,o rs i m p l ymechanism, rather than non-cooperative game.
3The meaning of "rights to talk" is not clear from an axiomatic viewpoint
(see for example Chae and Moulin (2004)). However, it has a clear meaning
in the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (2005). The right to talk is simply the
right to make a proposal. This right is dispelled as the size of the coalition
increases.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect that provides to maintain the "rights to
talk" of the players inside a coalition. We modify the mechanism by Vidal-
Puga (2005) so that players maintain their "rights to talk". Hence, the
coalitions with more members have more chances to make proposals. This
new mechanism is still a generalization of the mechanism of Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996), in the sense that both coincide when the coalition structure is
trivial (i.e. all the coalitions are singletons, or there exists a unique coalition).
In Section 2 we present the notation used throughout the paper. In
Section 3 we present the formal mechanism and state our main result. In
Section 4 we analyze an intriguing example presented by Krasa, Tamimi and
Yannelis (2003). Finally, Section 5 is devoted to a brief discussion.
2 Preliminaries
Let U be a (maybe inﬁnite) set of potential players.Anon-transferable util-
ity game,o rNTU game,i sap a i r(N,V) where N ⊂ U is ﬁnite and V is
a correspondence which assigns to each S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ a nonempty, closed,
convex and bounded-above subset V (S) ⊂ RS representing all the possible
payoﬀs that the members of S can obtain for themselves when playing co-
operatively. For S ⊂ N, we maintain the notation V when referring to the
application V restricted to S as player set. For simplicity, we denote V (i)
instead of V ({i}), S ∪ iinstead of S ∪ {i} and N\i instead of N\{i}.W e
denote the set of NTU games as NTU.
For each i ∈ N,l e tri := max{x : x ∈ V (i)}. We will assume that, for
each S ⊂ N and x ∈ V (S),t h ev e c t o ry ∈ RN with yi = xi for all i ∈ S and










for some v :2 N → R with v(∅)=0 ,w es a yt h a t(N,V) is a transferable
utility game (or TU game) and it is represented by (N,v).
Given N ⊂ U ﬁnite, we call coalition structure over N a partition of the
player set, i.e. C = {C1,C 2,...,Cp} ⊂ 2N is a coalition structure if it satisﬁes
S
Cq∈C Cq = N and Cq ∩ Cr = ∅ when q 6= r. A coalition structure C over
N is trivial if either C = {{i}}i∈N or C = {N}. For any S ⊂ N,w ed e n o t e
the restriction of C to the players in S as CS (notice that this implies that CS
m a yh a v el e s so rt h es a m en u m b e ro fc o a l i t i o n sa sC).
We denote an NTU game (N,V)with coalition structure C over N as
(N,V,C). We denote the set of NTU games with coalition structure as
CNTU.
Given G is a subset of NTUor CNTU,avalue in G is a correspondence
which assigns to each (N,V) ∈ G or (N,V,C) ∈ G a vector of RN. A well-
k n o w nv a l u ei nT Ug a m e si st h eShapley value (Shapley (1953)). We denote
the Shapley value of the TU game (N,v) as ϕN ∈ RN.F o rT Ug a m e sw i t h
coalition structure, Owen (1977) proposed a single value based on Shapley’s
which takes into account the coalition structure C. We call this value the
Owen coalitional value,o rs i m p l yt h eOwen value. W ed e n o t et h eO w e n
value of the TU game with coalition structure (N,v,C) as φ
N ∈ RN.
3T h e m e c h a n i s m
In this section we describe the coalitional mechanism. This mechanism is a
modiﬁcation of the bargaining mechanism presented in Vidal-Puga (2005).
Even though the model is deﬁned for NTU games, we focus on TU games.
Fix (N,V,C) ∈ CNTU.F o r e a c h S ⊂ N,w ed e n o t eb yΓS the set of






q for each C0
q ∈ CS.F o r






5The coalitional bargaining mechanism associated with (N,V,C) and ρ ∈
[0,1) is deﬁned as follows:
In each round there is a set S ⊂ N of active players. In the
ﬁrst round, S = N. Each round has one or two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, a proposer is randomly chosen from each coalition.
Namely, a function γ ∈ ΓS is randomly chosen, being each γ
equally likely to be chosen. The coalitions play sequentially (say,







) in the following way:
γ1 proposes a feasible payoﬀ, i.e. a vector in V (S).T h em e m b e r s
of C0
1\γ1 are then asked in some prespeciﬁed order to accept or
reject the proposal. If one of them rejects the proposal, then
we move to the next round where the set of active players is S
with probability ρ and S\γ1 with probability 1−ρ. In the latter
case, player γ1 gets rγ1.I fa l lt h ep l a y e r sa c c e p tt h ep r o p o s a l ,w e
move on to the next coalition, C0
2. Then, players of C0
2 proceed
to repeat the process under the same conditions, and so on. If
all the proposals are accepted in each coalition, the proposers are






In the second stage, a proposal is randomly chosen. The proba-









is chosen. We call player γq the






—t h e ya r ea s k e di ns o m ep r e s p e c i ﬁed order — then
the game ends with these payoﬀs. If it is rejected by at least
one member of S\C0
q, then we move to the next round where,
with probability ρ, the set of active players is again S and, with
probability 1−ρ, the entire coalition C0
q drops out and the set of
active players becomes S\C0
q. In the latter case each i ∈ C0
q gets
ri.
6Clearly, given any set of strategies, this mechanism ﬁnishes in a ﬁnite
number of rounds with probability 1.
This mechanism coincides with the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (2005) ex-
cept that the probability of a coalition to be chosen is proportional of its
size2.W i t ht h i sm o d i ﬁcation, when there is no rejection each player has the
same probability to be chosen r.p. Hence, players do not loose their "right to
talk" when joining a coalition.
The mechanism also generalizes Hart and Mas-Colell’s (1996) for trivial
coalition structures. For C = {N}, the second stage is trivial, since there
is a single representative and a single proposal. Moreover, the ﬁrst stage
coincides with Hart and Mas-Colell’s mechanism. For C = {{i}}i∈N,t h eﬁrst
stage is trivial. Each player states a proposal, and in the second stage a
proposal is randomly selected with equal probability and voted by the rest
of the players/coalitions.
As usual, we consider stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In this con-
text, an equilibrium is stationary if the players’ strategies depend only on
the set S of active players. They do not depend, however, on the previous
history or the number of played rounds.
Let S denote the set of active players. Given a set of stationary strategies,
we denote by a(S,i)γ ∈ V (S)the payoﬀ proposed by i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS when the














¢γ ∈ V (S) (1)
is the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ when all the proposals are accepted and γ deter-








γ ∈ V (S)
as the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ when all the proposals are accepted.
2In Vidal-Puga (2005) each coalition is chosen with the same probability.
7Given i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS,l e tΓS,i be the subset of functions γ ∈ ΓS such that
γq = i.N o t i c et h a t|ΓS| = |ΓS,i|
¯ ¯C0
q










be the expected payoﬀ proposed by i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS when he is a proposer.









































































γ for all i ∈ C0


















































Proposition 3.1 states that the probability that the ﬁn a lp r o p o s a lc o m e s
from a particular player (when all the proposals are accepted) is equal for all
the players, i.e. they maintain their respective "rights to talk".
8Theorem 3.1 Let (N,v,C) be a TU game with coalition structure. Assume






are accepted. Then, a(S)=ζ




S⊂N is inductively deﬁned as follows: ζ
{i}
i = ri for all i ∈ N.A s s u m e
we know ζ
















































for all i ∈ C0
q ∈ CS.
Proof. Assume the set of active players is S. Since all the proposals are
accepted, the ﬁnal expected payoﬀ is a(S).M o r e o v e r , t h e ﬁnal expected
payoﬀ when γ ∈ ΓS determines the set of proposers is a(S)
γ.
• Assume we are in the second stage and the r.p. is γq ∈ C0
q ∈ CS.I f
all the players in S\C0




¢γ.I fa t l e a s t a p l a y e r i n S\C0
q rejects γq’s proposal, the ﬁnal





.I t i s w e l l - k n o w n
that, in equilibrium, acceptable proposals would leave the responders











for all i ∈ S\C0
q .
• Let γ ∈ ΓS be the function which determines the set of proposers.
Given C0
q ∈ CS,a s s u m ew ea r ei nt h es u b g a m ew h i c hb e g i n sa f t e r
player γq makes his proposal a
¡
S,γq
¢γ. If all the players in C0
q\γq
accept γq’s proposal, the expected ﬁnal payoﬀ will be a(S)
γ. If at least
ap l a y e ri nC0





. By the same argument as above, we conclude
that
ai (S)





for all i ∈ C0
q\γq .
9The following claim states that the proposals are always Pareto eﬃcient:
Claim 3.1 Let γ ∈ ΓS be the function which determines the set of proposers.




γ = v(S). (6)
Assume Claim 3.1 does not hold, i.e.
P
j∈S aj (S,i)




γ+|S|ε ≤ v(S). Suppose player i changes his strategy
and proposes b(S,i)
γ with bj (S,i)
γ := aj (S,i)
γ+ε for all j ∈ S. By a similar
argument as before, it is straightforward to check that this new proposal is
bound to be accepted in both the ﬁrst and the second stages. Hence, the
expected ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i increases by |C0
q|
|S| ε. This contraction proves
Claim 3.1.




Fix i ∈ C0






























¯ ¯ [ρaj(S)+( 1− ρ)aj(S\C
0
r)]
= ρaj(S)+( 1− ρ)






















































































































ρaj (S)+( 1− ρ)

 |S| ¯ ¯C0
q

















j∈S\i ρaj (S)=ρ(v(S) − ai (S)) and thus



















 |S| ¯ ¯C0
q




























ρai (S)+( 1− ρ)

 |S| ¯ ¯C0
q






















































































11Hence, adding terms, |S|ai (S)=




















 |S| ¯ ¯C0
q





































































from where the result is easily deduced following a standard induction argu-
ment.
4 An eloquent example
Krasa, Temimi and Yannelis (2003) propose a three-person economy with
diﬀerential information where two players bargain as one unit against the
third one. When there is complete information, the economy can be expressed















12When there is diﬀerential information, due to incentive incompatibility,
1 and 2 a r eo n l ya b l et oa c h i e v ev({1,2})=2by themselves. For any other
S ⊂ N, v(S) is the same as under complete information.
Krasa, Temimi and Yannelis take the Owen value φ
N as a measure of
players’ expectations when 1 and 2 join forces. Their result is that bargaining
as one unit is advantageous if and only if information is complete, as the next
table shows:
φ


























Consider now that we take ζ
N as a measure of players’ expectations when
1 and 2 join forces. Then, bargaining as one unit is advantageous in any case,
as the next table shows:
ζ


























This last situation corresponds to the assumption that players, by joining,
do not loose their respective "rights to talk". Note also that the beneﬁtf r o m
cooperation is 1
32 for each player in both cases.
5 Discussion
The Owen value seems to be a good measure of players’ expectations when
the coalition structure is exogenously given. For example, wage bargaining
between ﬁrms and labor unions, tariﬀ bargaining between countries, bar-
gaining between the member states of a federated country, etc. In these
situations, players do not have to wonder whether they would do it better
bargaining as a unit, because it is something out of their control.
13On the other hand, Hart and Kurz (1983) followed the idea that players
form coalition structures in order to improve their bargaining strength. They
studied four reasonable properties, or axioms, that determine uniquely the
Owen value. The only property that is not satisﬁed by ζ is Carrier (p. 1051),
which states that moving null players3 does not aﬀect the outcome of the rest
of the agents. We will contest this property4.
In bargaining problems, asymmetries in the ﬁnal outcome may be due to
the players’ diﬀerent bargaining powers. As Binmore (1998, p. 80) points out:
“Bargaining powers are determined by the strategic advantages conferred on
players by the circumstances under which they bargain.” In our case, the
coalition structure. Assume for example a game in which all the players are
mutually substitutes5. Since no asymmetries are introduced in the model,
the expectation ap r i o r ishould be the same for substitute players, i.e. all
players are supposed to have equal bargaining powers. In general games,
however, nothing is said about the bargaining power of the null players! If we
admit that null players do have bargaining power, then this fact can somehow
increase the aggregate power of the coalition they join.
Take for example the unanimity game (N,v) where N = {1,2} and
v(N)=1 , v({1})=v({2})=0 . By a symmetry argument, the value
of each player should be 1
2, i.e. the expectation of each player before any
implementation of the game is the same.
Assume now we add a null player 3.W e g e t t h e g a m e (N0,v 0) with
N0 = {1,2,3} and v0 (S)=1if {1,2} ⊂ S and v0 (S)=0otherwise. What
w o u l dt h ep l a y e r s ’e x p e c t a t i o nb ei nt h i sn e wg a m e ?
It can be argued that the situation does not change with the presence
of a player that does not contribute anything to any coalition. Hence, the






. However, the situation may signiﬁcantly
3A null player is a player i with v(S ∪ i)=v(S) for all S.
4The Carrier axiom in Hart and Kurz has two parts, one of them (i) can also be split
into two properties: eﬃciency (the value is eﬃcient for all coalition structures) and dummy
(null players get zero). ζ satisﬁes eﬃciency, but not dummy.
5Two players i,j are substitutes if v(S ∪ i)=v (S ∪ j) for all S with i,j / ∈ S.
14change if we assume that player 3 joins forces with player 2.I n t h i s c a s e ,






in the previous game
(N,v) vanishes. Player 1 and coalition {2,3} are substitutes in the game
between coalitions, but not completely symmetric. The fact that {2,3} has
two members introduces an endogenous asymmetry. Hart and Kurz (p. 1048)
describe this situation as follows:
As an everyday example of such a situation, “I will have to
check this with my wife/husband” may (but not necessarily) lead
to a better bargaining position, due to the fact that the other
party has to convince both the player and the spouse.
I fw ea c c e p tt h a tp l a y e r2 may beneﬁtf r o mt h es u p p o r to fp l a y e r3,o n e
may wonder how to quantify this beneﬁt. The value ζ provides a possi-










structure is C = {{1},{2,3}}.
References
[1] Albizuri M.J. and J.M. Zarzuelo, 2004, On coalitional semivalues, Games
and Economic Behavior 49, 221-243.
[2] Binmore K., 1998, Just playing, Game theory and the social contract,
Volume 2, MIT Press.
[3] Calvo E., J. Lasaga and E. Winter, 1996, The principle of balanced con-
tributions and hierarchies of cooperation, Mathematical Social Sciences
31, 171-182.
[4] Chae S. and P. Heidhues, 2004, A group bargaining solution, Mathe-
matical Social Sciences 48(1), 37-53.
[5] Chae S. and H. Moulin, 2004, Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic
viewpoint, Mimeo.
15[6] Harsanyi J.C., 1977, Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in
games and social situations, Cambridge University Press.
[7] Hart S. and M. Kurz, 1983, Endogenous formation of coalitions, Econo-
metrica 51(4), 1047-1064.
[8] Hart S. and A. Mas-Colell, 1996, Bargaining and value, Econometrica
64, 357-380.
[9] Krasa S., A. Temimi and N.C. Yannelis, 2003, Coalition structure values
in diﬀerential information economies: is unity a strength? Journal of
Mathematical Economics 39, 51-62.
[10] Owen G., 1977, Values of games with a priori unions, in: R. Henn and
O. Moeschlin, eds., Essays in mathematical economics and game theory
(Berlin), Springer-Verlag, 76-88.
[11] Shapley L.S., 1953, A value for n-person games, in: H.W. Kuhn and
A.W. Tucker, eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games II (Princeton
NJ), Princeton University Press, 307-317.
[12] Vidal-Puga J.J., 2005, A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the
Nash solution with coalition structure, Economic Theory 25(3), 679-701.
[13] Vidal-Puga J.J. and G. Bergantiños, 2003, An implementation of the
Owen value, Games and Economic Behavior 44, 412-427.
[14] Winter E., 1992, The consistency and potential for values of games with
coalition structure, Games and Economic Behavior 4, 132-144.
16